New Mexico Historical Review
Volume 35

Number 4

Article 2

10-1-1960

The Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico
Robert Emmet Clark

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr

Recommended Citation
Clark, Robert Emmet. "The Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico." New Mexico Historical Review 35, 4
(1960). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol35/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL
REVIEW
VOL. XXXV

OCTOBER, 1960
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THE PUEBLO RIGHTS DOCTRINE IN NEW MEXICO
By ROBERT EMMET CLARK *

MAY 6, 1955, an amended complaint was filed in the
O
District Court for San Miguel County that eventually
produced the decision in Cartwright et al. v. The Public
N

Service Co. of New Mexico, 66 N.M. 64.343 P.2d 654 (September 3, 1959). Cartwright was joined by about 100 surface
water users from the Gallinas River, ·including the State Insane Asylum, in this action. The plaintiffs alleged interference by the defendant with their prior appropriative rights.
During the early course of the proceedings the water users
were permitted to amend their pleadings to conform to the
proof. The Town of Las Vegas, a municipal corporation, was
also granted leave to intervene in the case. After hearing
the case the trial judge, on April 23, 1956, made findings of
fact and prepared conclusions of law upon which he rested his
decision in favor of the defendant Public Service Company.]
The District Judge found as a fact that the Town of .Las
Vegas and the City of Las Vegas were successors in interest
to the Mexican pueblo (known as Nuestra Senora de las
Dolores de Las Vegas) established under Mexican law on
April 6, 1835. The court found: 2
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
1. The Public Service Company of New Mexico is a private corporation and is 'not
a governmental or public corporation such as a ditch company or conservancy district.
It is a private corporation publicly regulated. In other words, it is a public utility.
The defendant h~re should not be confused with the Public Service Commission (N. M.
STAT. ANN. 1953, 68-4-1 et seq through 68-10-1 et seq), a statutory public utilities
commission.
2. The Supreme Court reproduced in full the District Judge's findings and conclusions, 343 P.2d 654 at 655-659. There are a total of 25 separate findings of fact and 6
separate conclusions of law. However, formal requirements of statements of jurisdiction
and other matters partly explain theIr number.
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That the laws of the Republic of Mexico in force at the
time the pueblo of Nuestra Senora de Las Dolores de Las Vegas
was established, and continuing in force to the time of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, provided that Mexican colonization pueblos should have a prior and paramount right to the use
of so much of the water of streams or rivers flowing through
or along or beside such pueblos as should be necessary for the
use of such pueblos and their inhabitants, and for the continued
use of such pueblos, and their inhabitants by reason of increased growth and size and use. (my emphasis)

The grant was confirmed by Congress in 1860 and a patent issued. 3 The term pueblo in this context had and has
nothing to do with rights of Indians. 4 The term pueblo means
town. The Indians who were discovered by the early Spaniards living in towns were called pueblo Indians which distinguished them from the nomadic Apache, Comanche and
Navajo.
The District Court found that the Gallinas River was the
sole source of supply for the pueblo and its successors, the
town and city of Las Vegas; that in 1880 the Agua Pura
Company, a private corporation, received a 50 year franchise
properly granted by the County Commission of San Miguel
County; that this franchise carried the right to distribute
the municipal water supply to the town and city and that The
Public Service Company is the successor to the Agua Pura
Company.
The court also found that water rights of the citY and
town were not litigated in the Federal equity case entitled
U. S. v. Hope Community Diteh,5 which began in 1920 and
3. 12 Stat. 70, Section 3 of the Act of Congress, June 21, 1860. See 343 P.2d 654 at
663: "The Section of the Act of 1860 confirming the Las Vegas Grant is in the same
language, except for the claim made, as that confirming the other Mexican grants by
the same Act."
4. There is some confusion on this point that is found in the briefs. See Amicus
Brief of City of Albuquerque (in opposition to motion for rehearing) at page 11-12
where the idea of Indian rights is refuted. Indian rights and titles are a field apart. The
point under discussion conc'erns colonization pueblos and not the confirmation of Indian
rights. Indians have available additional constitutional, treaty and compact safeguards.
However, the question of priority between Indian claims and pueblo rights is not part
of this discussion even though,as will "appear obvious from the later discussion. the
claims of towns under the pueblo rights doctrine to large supplies of water may
threaten to impair existing Indian uses, e.g., if Albuquerque were to establish a pueblo
right, the -effect on the Rio Grande at Isleta Pueblo would no doubt result in action
by the Indians to find out who has a prior legal right.
5. No. 712, Equity, U. S. District Court for New Mexico (1933).
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ended in 1933 with a decree that adjudicated water rights on
the Pecos and its tributaries.
The District Court reached these conclusions of law:
The Town and City of Las Vegas had and continues to
have paramount rights to Gallinas waters dating back to
1835 that are superior to Plaintiff's appropriative rights.
The Public Service Company is diverting and distributing
this water supply for the proper purposes of municipal needs
and may continue to do so.
The Hope decree is not res judicata as to the legal question
raised by the case, Le., the issue of pueblo rights was not cut
off by the Hope Decree.
On the basis of the facts as found and these conclusions
of law, the District Court entered judgment dismissing the
Plaintiff's complaint.
The Plaintiff appealed this decision to the New Mexico
Supreme Court. Briefs were filed as usual by both sides and
by others not parties to the litigation. These were not ordinary briefs. They were the work of a large number of lawyers
and they filled many pages. Both the State of New Mexico
through the Attorney General and the City of Albuquerque
filed amicus curiae 6 briefs because of the great public questions involved. Two irrigation districts, the Interstate Stream
Commission and the State Engineer joined in the State's
amicus brief. The court heard extended oral arguments. The
case :was under consideration until December 12, 1958, when
a 3-2 decision was handed down which affirmed the trial
court. Subsequently a rehearing was sought. and more briefs
were filed. On June 1, 1959, the court reaffirmed its original
stand in a one paragraph opinion and denied the motion for
a rehearing. The two dissenting judges filed another long
dissenting opinion. Thereafter following the mandate there
were three additional motions filed-for another rehearing,
to recall the mandate and a motion for a five judge court to
hear the new·motions, Justice Sadler having retired. On September 3, 1959 the court denied all of the motions. Under
6. An uamicus curiae" is not a party to an action and does not legally appear for
anyone, but is merely a friend of the court whose sole function is to advise or make
suggestions to the court.
.
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authority of earlier cases the justices declined to call in another judge to break the existing tie. This meant that the
original opinion stood. The two dissenting justices filed another dissenting opinion. The majority and dissenting opinions cover 42 pages in the printed reports.
The Supreme Court framed the appeal in the context of
three questions:
Did the Hope decree bar the present assertion of pueblo
rights?
Did some of the plaintiffs have water rights superior to
any pueblo rights because they were prior in time and were
based on allegedly older appropriation rights?
Is the New Mexico court entitled to apply the pueblo
rights doctrine as developed and recognized in California?
The nature and effect of the Hope degree, although extremely important to the decision, is of special interest to
lawyers. This decree, entered in the United States District
Court in 1933, provided the grounds for a la:ter petition by
the New Mexico State Engineer in February, 1960 which is
discussed in the Federal Court sequel to the State Supreme
Court decision being examined here. The plaintiff water users
in the main case claimed that the defendant corporation and
the town of Las Vegas could not assert pueblo rights in 1955
because the town's rights had been adjudicated by the Hope
equity proceeding. The defendant, on the other hand, contended that the Hope decree had no application because the
town and city of Las Vegas had not participated in the proceedings and no water rights as to them had been adjudicated.
The Supreme Court interpreted the record to show no appearance or any participation by the Town or the City. Thus, the
court concluded, the Town and City were not barred by the
principle of res judicata from asserting pueblo rights in the
present proceeding. (Res judicata applied in this context
means that no water rights had been litigated and new claims
could be made.)
The plaintiffs who claimed as heirs under the title of Luis
Cabeza de Baca asserted rights that were alleged to go back
to 1821, or before the pueblo was founded in 1835. The court's
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statement on this point is somewhat misleading: 7 "This becomes known as the claim of the Baca heirs under whom
some, if not all, of the plaintiffs claim. Plaintiffs' sub-point B,
under Point I, is apparently that the Heirs of Luis Cabeza
de Baca filed a conflicting claim to the Las Vegas Grant."
Actually the plaintiffs were claiming under an early priority
confirmed by the Hope decree and thus they were claiming
rights under the community grant. The Supreme Court made
it clear that "The record abundantly establishes that the Congress of the United States confirmed the Las Vegas Grant 8 as
a valid Mexican grant to the Town of Las Vegas." In this
manner it is clear that the plaintiffs were claiming from the
same source as the municipality. The patent to the grant was
issued in 1860. No conflicting claims were recognized at that
time. The court referred to an earlier decision D that said that
a grant by Mexico under conditions that were properly shown
did not need legislative confirmation. In effect they recognized
judicial confirmation of a grant.
The applicability of the pueblo rights doctrine is the subject of primary interest. It is the part of the decision with
important ramifications. The court concluded that the doctrine was applicable in New Mexico and the Plaintiffs' claims
were held to have been properly dismissed by the trial judge.
The court said: 10
This leaves for final determination of the three basic
questions listed near the beginning of this opinion, viz., the
question of whether the doctrine of Pueblo Rights was properly recognized and applied by the trial court in disposing of
this case. It should be enough at this point in our opinion,
without setting out all the facts pertinent to the question, to
say the learned judge did recognize the doctrine and apply it to
the facts found, thereby upholding the doctrine in its relation
to the rights of the Town of Las Vegas, the City of Las Vegas
and the defendant, respectively, in and to the waters of the
Gallinas River under said doctrine.

*

*

*

*

7. 343 P.2d 654, 663-665 (1959).
8. Stat. 71, Sec. 3 Act of -Congress, June 21, 1860.
9. State ex reI State Game Commission v. Red River Valley Co. 51 N.M. 207, 182
P.2d 421 (1947).
10. Cartwright v. Public Service Co., 343 P.2d 654, 664-669.
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It is not surprising that a doctrine such as the Pueblo
Rights arose when we consider the fact that these colonization
pueblos to which the right attached were largely, if indeed, not
always, established before there was any settlement of the surrounding area. Thus it resulted that there had never been any
prior appropriations or use of water of the river or stream, nor
any allotment of lands, by the Mexican government prior to the
establishment of the Pueblo.
[3] It is the claim of plaintiffs (appellants) that constitutional and statutory provisions touching the use of water is
contrary to the Pueblo Rights doctrine and that it can find no
place in our jurisprudence. They fail, however, to point out in
what respect this is true. This Court has long recognized that
we have followed the Mexican law of water rights rather than
the common law. In Martinez ·v. Cook, 56 N.M. 343, 244 P.2d
134, 138, we said: "Particularly, we have never followed it in
connection with our waters, but, on the contrary, have followed
the Mexican or civil law, and what is called the Colorado doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use."
We see nothing in the theory of Pueblo Rights inconsistent
with the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use. The
Town of Las Vegas was granted a water right by the Mexican
government in 1835.
It is an admitted fact that the doctrine of Pueblo Rights as
we understand and all the parties argue it is well recognized in
the State of California. The parties agree that the question has
not been determined in the State of New Mexico, although both
parties seek to gain some comfort from' two New Mexico cases
which mention the doctrine. They are the cases of State ex reI.
Community Ditches v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 19 N.M.
352, 143 P. 207, and the case of New Mexico Products v. New
Mexico Power Co., 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d 634. In neither case
was any position taken by the Court on the doctrine. In the
Tularosa Ditch case the Court merely referred to it and said
the right could not be sustained under the facts of that case
because Tularosa was founded long after the territory was acquired by the United States and had never been a Mexican
pueblo. In the New Mexico Products Co. case, supra, we referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in United States v. City of Santa Fe, 165 U.S. 675,
17 S. Ct. 472, 41 L.Ed. 874, where it was held that Santa Fe was
never established by the Sp~nish or Mexican government as a
pueblo and therefore could not claim pueblo rights. We did not
in either of the cases mentioned hold that the doctrine of Pueblo
Rights was not applicable in New Mexico, but only that, under
the facts before us, neither Town had such rights ... in State
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v. Tularosa Community Ditch, supra, .. We said [19 N.M.
352,143 P. 215] :
"At first the plan for the establishment of these pueblos
was for the King of Spain, in each case by special ordinance, to
provide for the foundation of the pueblo, and to set apart for
the use of the pueblo and its inhabitants a certain area of land,
and to prescribe in the ordinance the rights of the pueblo and
its inhabitants to the use of the waters flowing to those lands.
* * * And, further, it was also at this time provided by the King,
by general ordinance, that thereafterward the provisions and
rights granted and the general plan followed in the foundation
of the pueblo of Pictic should be followed in the foundation of
any new pueblos in the jurisdiction of the commanding general
of the internal Provinces of the West, of which California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas constituted a part. * * * And this
pueblo right to the use of water, or the right of all the inhabitants in common within the jurisdiction of the pueblo, was superior to the individual rights of appropriators, and also superior to the right of the riparian proprietors, through whose
fields the stream ran."
As already stated, however, neither this case nor that of
the New Mexico Products Co. v. New Mexico Power Co. may be
cited with ·any justification by any party. to this suit as sustaining a position taken by this Court on the Pueblo Rights
doctrine.

*

*

*

*

[4] (And) in California the priority of right in a colonization pueblo to take all the waters of a non-navigable stream for
the use of its inhabitants on an expanding scale necessary for
the benefit of its inhabitants was early recognized and enforced.
Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530; Lux v. Haggin; 69 Cal. 255, 4 P.
919,10 P. 674; Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
106 Cal. 237, 39 P. 762; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles
Farming & Drilling Co., 152 Cal. 645, 93 P. 869, 1135; City of
San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 209 Cal. 105,287 P. 475;
City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597,57 P. 585; Hooker
v: City of Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314, 23 S.Ct. 395,47 L.Ed. 487;
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

*

*

*

*

It was as early as 1789 that the King of Spain established
the Town of Pictic in New Spain and gave the settlement preferred rights to all available water from which evolved the doctrine of Pueblo Rights. 1 Kinney on Irrigation and Water
Rights 996. And as shown by the quotation from Kinney in
State v. Tularosa Community Ditch, supra, the King decreed
that thereafter the general plan followed in the foundation of
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the Pueblo of Pictic should be followed in the foundation of
any new pueblos in California, Arizona, New Mexico and
Texas.

*

*

*, *

[6] We are unable to avoid the conclusion that the reasons
which brought the Supreme Court of California to uphold and
enforce the Pueblo Rights doctrine apply with as much force in
New Mexico as they do in California. A new, undeveloped and
unoccupied territory was being settled. There were no questions
of priority of use when a colonization pueblo was established
because there were no such users. Water formed the life blood
of the community or settlement, not only in its origin but as it
grew and expanded. A group of fifty families at the founding of
a colony found it no more so than when their number was multiplied to hundreds or even thousands in an orderly, progressive
growth.
And just as in the case of a private user, so long as he
proceeds with due dispatch to reduce to beneficial use the larger
area to which his permit entitles him, enjoys a priority for the
whole, so by analogy and under the rationale of the Pueblo
Rights doctrine, the settlers who founded a colonization pueblo,
in the process of growth and expansion, carried with them the
torch of priority, so long as there was available water to supply
the life blood of the expanded community. There is present in
the doctrine discussed the recognizable presence of lex suprema,
the police power, which furnishes answer to claims of confiscation always present when private and public rights or claims
collide. Compare, Middle Rio Grande Water Users Ass'n v.
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 57 N.M. 287, 310, 258
P.2d 391. So, here, we see in the Pueblo Rights doctrine the
elevation of the public good over the claim of a private right.

*

*

*

*

Public Service Company does not own the pueblo rights of
said City and Town, as the trial judge viewed the matter. His
findings, conclusions and judgment so reflect and affirm. It
merely acted as the agent and instrumentality of said City and
Town in enabling their inhabitants to enjoy to the fullest extent
the pueblo rights inaugurated by the King of Spain. Yet, even
he, the King, but bespoke a fact of life as ancient as the hills
when he became author of the Plan of Pictic. Water is as essential to the life of a community as are air and water to the
life of an individual. It is frequently mentioned as the "life
bloodof a community." It is precious. It is priceless. A community, whether corporate or not, possessing such an indispensable right can neither sell, barter, exchange, or give it
away. Either this is so, or the supposed benefaction of the King
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of Spain in anugurating the Plan of Pictic became in reality
an obituary instead. Water is essential to life. Without it we
perish.
Furthermore, we can no more ignore the Pueblo Rights
doctrine as a major issue in this case than could we with propriety decline to entertain this appeal. It is raised both by defendant's answer and the "further, separate" and affirmative
defense of intervenor filed in the cause, and so recognized by
Judge Brand in his letter to all counsel under date of January 30, 195~, and the judgment itself. Either the court and all
counsel at the pre-trial conference misapprehended what the
major issue was, or it projected itself as such surely and
unmistakably.
We think the trial court was correct in sustaining the
claim of defendant and intervenor under the Pueblo Rights
doctrine. Other collateral questions are argued but they either
are resolved by what we have said, found to be without merit,
or unnecessary to determine....
It will be so ordered.

The dissenting opinions l l are both technical and policy
oriented. The dissenters question the applicability of the
Pueblo Rights doctrine on constitutional, historical, procedural, jurisdictional and public policy grounds.
Their first main point is that the pueblo rights question
was not properly before the court since the Town of Las
Vegas did not assert such rights. The community was merely
an intervenor. Thus the Public Service Company was asserting a right which was not its property. The dissent stresses
that the Public Service Company is merely a carrier and distributor of water under a franchise with the community, and
even though the pleadings in the case state that the utility is
"the instrumentality of the intervenor" it is not the owner
of the community's water rights. The utility could not assert
any title or ownership to the "pueblo water rights" because
its rights are those obtained from its predecessor, The Agua
Pura Company, which had its 1881 priority adjudicated by
the Hope decree. This contention of the dissenters is supported by the records of the State Engineer's office and other
documents in the case. The dissenters believe that the sole
issue before the court was whether the Public Service Com11. They cover about 26 printed pages.
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pany was using more than the 2,600 acre feet allocated to the
Agua Pura Company and in which, the dissent says; the community may have also had an interest. This amount was reconfirmed by the State Engineer in 1950. On this basis the
dissent concludes that the Hope decree is res judicata between the plaintiffs and the Public Service Company, i.e., the
assertion of pueblo rights by the Public Service Company at
this time is barred by established legal principles.
The dissent also expresses the view that the only possible
way the Public Service Company may assert pueblo rights is
as Trustee for the Town of Las Vegas and its inhabitants,12
But here the dissent directs attention to the fact that the town
was a party in the earlier Hope adjudication. It did not file
an Answer in the proceeding or make a claim at that time
but there was an appearance by the Town's lawyer in these
words quoted in the opinion: 13 "I also appear for the Town
of Las Vegas, and consumers of water of the Town of Las
Vegas, in the event it becomes necessary to appear for said
parties by reason of any adjudication of the title to the water
between them and the Agua Pura Company as to the water
rights of the consumers of the Town of Las Vegas."
The dissent's construction of these words differs from the
view of the majority and is of course a crucial element in the
decision. The second dissenting opinion, filed after the second .
motion for a rehearing was denied, re-emphasizes that the
Agua PuraCompany's rights were adjudicated in the Hope
decree and since the Public Service Company could not have
greater rights than it received from its predecessor, its present rights cannot be greater than those received under the
decree.
Moving on to a consequence of the majority decision, the
dissent declares that it "will cast a cloud on all stream rights
in the Pecos stream system, to say nothing of what will happen to the Rio Grande water rights as shown by briefs herein
of amicus curiae." 14 The dissent states that "the Doctrine of
Pueblo Water Rights as enunciated by the California courts
12. Dissent page 672.
13. Dissent page 673.
14. Dissent page 674.
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should not be followed and declared to also be the law of New
Mexico."15 The dissent expresses the view that the new doctrine is California doctrine made necessary by demands for
an adequate city supply for Los Angeles and is not the old
pueblo rights doctrine. 16
There is a sharp criticism of the majority's statement of
history to the effect that: 17 "A new, undeveloped and unoccupied territory was being settled. There were no questions
of priority of use when a colonization pueblo was established

because there were no such users."
The dissent quotes from a case decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court in 1892 which recites facts clearly showing
that in 1819 a grant was made to one Antonio Ortiz in the
area of the Gallinas river.I 8 This record indicates that the
Gallinas area was not unoccupied territory.
The old question is raised of whether the Las Vegas area
was part of Texas and not subject to the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. 19 This treaty with Mexico was required to recognize
only vested rights. If there were any water rights existing at
that time they were what in law are called contingent rights
based on Mexican Law. It was this theory that the California
courts and the California legislature molded into the California pueblo rights doctrine. No such evolution of legal doctrine took place in New Mexico. In fact, the court has twice
refused to apply this doctrine: "On two prior occasions this
Court has carefully desisted from expressing an opinion that
the pueblo rights doctrine applied in New Mexico."20 Moreover, the dissent says, the doctrine contradicts appropriation
theory and practice as developed in New Mexico and which
is a doctrine of rights based on actual beneficial uses. In addition, it jeopardizes our interstate relations under the Pecos
and other compacts and under established principles of interstate allocation.
The dissenters would have granted all three of the subse15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.• 677-678.
17. Dissent quotes majority at page 686.
18. Ibid.• 687 quoting from Waddingham
(1892) .
19. Ibid.• 687.
20. Ibid., 674.

v. Robledo

6 N.M. 347, 28

Pac.

663, 667
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quent and final motions filed in th~ case. Emphasis is placed
on a newly raised jurisdictional question, viz., that the Las
Vegas Grant created by territorial legislation in 1903 was an
indispensable party because the Town of Las Vegas, which
did not exist as a municipal corporation in 1860 when the
Las Vegas Grant was confirmed by the Congress, was and is
within the exterior boundaries of this grant. 21 The dissenters
believe this was a serious question which should have been
reviewed by a five man court rather than by the four remaining justices who were divided 2-2 after the retirement of
Justice Sadler.
The law of the case, the majority opinion, holds that the
Public Service Company through its franchise from the Town
and City of Las Vegas was entitled to assert the pueblo rights
doctrine as imported from California and that the municipalities' rights to the waters of the Gallinas were not litigated or
determined in the Hope decree.
The decision raises a large number of questions including
future attacks on the Hope decree.
Can the pueblo rights doctrine as derived from the Plan
of Pictic (or Pitic) and the California cases be applied elsewhere in the State?
The theoretical answer is yes. However, the likelihood of
its application is not great. The Plan of Pictic was devised
in 1789.22 At that time New Mexico, as a part of New Spain,
had a pretty well settled tradition. Some important Rio
Grande towns had long been established, e.g., Albuquerque
was already officially over 80 years old. 23 The Rio Abajo towns
were established later than the Rio Arriba towns. These lower
river towns were settled after the Pueblo Rebellion of 1680
when the Spaniards retreated to EI Paso del Norte. 24 Santa
Fe was founded earlier in 1610. Most of the large land grants
in the river areas had also been made before 1789. If the Rio
Grande and Pecos river towns are to establish pueblo rights
21. Ibid., 692-693.
22. Ibid.. 668. "It was as early as 1789 that the King of Spain established the Town
of Pictic in New Spain and gave the settlement preferred rights to all available water
from which evolved the doctrine of Pueblo Rights. . • •"
23. Historians tell us that the City was founded in 1706.
24. Blackmar, Spanish Institutions of the Southwest, p. 225 (1891).
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they will have to find some law older than the Plan of Pictic
of 1789 on which to base their claims, assuming of course
that water rights were included in them in the manner of the
Plan of Pictic. That this can be done is highly doubtful for
a number of reasons. It should be pointed out, however, that
California precedent will be of little or no help if some pre1789 pueblo grants are discovered in New Mexico. California was not occupied until long after New Mexico was settled.
Although the early explorers had sailed along the coast in
1542-43, California was not of sufficient importance to
SPAIN to encourage occupation until 1769-1770 when San
Diego and Monterey were occupied as part of a counterbalance to the Russian activities in Alaska between 1745 and
1765.25 The so called "mission period" extended from 1769
to 1823. Civil municipalities, as distinguished from the missions and presidios, were called pueblos. 26 Los Angeles, El
Pueblo de Nuestra Senora La Reina de Los Angeles, was established as a pueblo in 178l,27
Will communities claiming the benefits of the pueblo
rights doctrine be required to produce formal documents establishing the date and circumstances of their founding?
Apparently they will under the principle discussed in New
Mexico Products Co. v. New Mexico Power CO.28 This case
relied upon a decision of the United States Supreme Court
in U. S. v. City of Santa Fe,29 which held that it was never
established that Santa Fe was founded by the Spanish or
Mexican government as a pueblo and therefore it could not
claim pueblo rights. However, at the time the New Mexico
Products case was tried, the Orders regarding the founding
of the City of Santa Fe received by Governor Pedro de
Peralta had been published and translated in the pages of
the NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW in 1930. 30 The founding
apparently took place between 1609 and 1614 and very probably in 1610.
25. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1955 ed., vol. 4, p. 591.
26. Blackmar. supra, p. 153: "The purely civil colonies of California were called
pueblos to distinguish them from missions and presidios. . . ."
27. Feliz v. Los Angeles, 58 Calif. 73, 78-80 (1881).
28. 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d 634 (1937).
29. 165 U.S. 675 (1897).
30. Vol. 4, NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, pps. 179-194 (1929).
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California of course has followed a de facto or in fact
founding principle rather than a de jure or legal theory, Le.,
the formal legal documents are not the important test but the
actual existence of a community.
What effect will this doctrine have on interstate stream
apportionment and interstate compacts? It may have considerable effect in terms of interstate suspicion and complaint
even if no actual pueblo rights beyond those claimed in the
Cartwright case are recognized. If additional actual claims
are made and substantiated some demands may occur for
compact renegotiations or new apportionments. The compacts are subject to the overriding appropriation doctrine
with its hierarchy of priorities and preferences. The effect on
intrastate rights is obvious from this case.
What problems does this decision present in the area of
public control and supervision of water resources charged
by law to the State Engineer? The case raises questions about
methods for determining supply in a given area. It makes
the job of the State Engineer extremely difficult in anticipating demands in terms of known rights and projected uses.
There is an increased element of uncertainty in the picture
of determining available supply at a given place or for a particular purpose. It will undoubtedly add to the administrative
burden of the State Engineer's office in that he will have to
spend more time gathering data to show some claim to be
baseless in fact.
Does the doctrine apply to ground water? It does not unless the State Engineer wishes to have his interrelationship
theory of surface and ground water pressed to the ultimate
limits. The California cases if they are followed in this matter
may prove helpful to compel the State Engineer to go to that
length, although it must be remembered that under the common law and the civil law of Spain percolating ground waters
belonged to the land owner. 31
This question is of course very important since most of
the claims of towns like Albuquerque will be to ground
waters. For instance, the Town of Atrisco "laid claim to all
31. See Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Arizona 227, 255 P.2d 173 at 176 (1953) Citing
Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, Vol. 1, sec. 563, 2d ed.
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of the Rio Grande water it needs for its growth, including
underground water. . . . "32 In areas outside of the declared
ground water basins where the State Engineer has no jurisdiction the problem will also be important if a pueblo right
is asserted and proved.
Any new public policy that recognizes the claims of a city
is good law in terms of utility and necessity. However, the
method of reasoning in this case from uncertain historical
premises and dubious Spanish, Mexican and California precedents is not very persuasive. The oblique reliance on the police
power of the state to limit property rights, i.e., prior appropriation rights, seems contrived. Hortatory expressions like
the following from the majority opinion 33 state the obvious, but they are not good substitutes for analysis and
explanation:
Public Service Company does not own the pueblo rights of
said City and Town, as the trial judge viewed the matter. His
findings, conclusions and judgment so reflect and affirm. It
merely acted as the agent and instrumentality of said City and
Town in enabling their inhabitants to enjoy to the fullest extent the pueblo rights inaugurated by the King of Spain. Yet,
even he, the King, but bespoke a fact of life as ancient as the
hills when he became author of the Plan of Pictic. Water is as
essential to the life of a community as are air and water to the
life of an individual. It is frequently mentioned as the "life
blood of a community." It is precious. It is priceless. A community, whether corporate or not, possessing such an indispensable right can neither sell, barter, exchange, or: give away.
Either this is so, or the supposed benefaction of the King of
Spain in inaugurating the Plan of Pictic beca1ne in reality an
obituary instead. Water is essential to life. Without it we
perish. (My emphasis)

The modern reading of the police power into the pueblo
rights doetrine 34 of the colonial period is not easily accepted
as the basis for an act that amounts to confiscation. The police
power is an important attribute of the state's power to provide for the health, safety and general welfare of the people.
32. Albuquerque Journal, November 3, 1959.
33. Cartwright v. Public Service Co. 343 P.2d 654, 669 (1959).
34. Ibid., 668-669: "There is present in the doctrine discussed the recognizable
presence of lex suprema, the police power, which furnished answer to claims of confiscation always present when private and public rights or claims collide.. ~ ."
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There is no constitutional limitation on its exercise except
that it be reasonable. No compensation need be paid. Eminent
domain, on the other hand, has been the traditional method
for taking private property for a public use and constitutional
guarantees require just compensation. The revival of a community power long dormant and unknown through the conjuring up of doubtful legal history and non-applicable California decisions is not the way to get to the heart of the main
problempresented by the case. I refer of course to preferences
among water uses. The dissent makes clear "that municipalities do have a preferential right but such right is a preference
developed by the law of appropriation,"35 and would require
condemnation and compensation. No doubt in some communities this method would be inadequate and the police power
would have to be invoked to preserve the health, safety and
welfare of a community. For citizens must and will have
water to drink. However, their supply should not be preserved
in the guise of historical rights. In summary, the Cartwright
case reaches a desirable result in assuring community supply but it does so over a course of intellectual hurdles one
may find hard to leap.
The case will continue to be important no matter how narrowly the principle it announces is construed. It calls attention to the matter of preferences among water uses which
must be re-examined by the public and the legislature. The
West's water law institutions have long been dominated by
agricultural and mining requirements. While these are extremely important and will certainly continue to be so, it must
be recognized that the pressing demands of the future, while
not necessarily large in volume, are the key to the West's development, such as residential, industrial and recreational
uses. It is expected that by 1980 the population of the Nation
will have'increased by 75 million. 36 In the 11 far western
states population increases are expected to continue to be
over 3 times as great as the rate for the Nation. Between 1940
and 1955 the increase in the 11 far western states was 83%
35. Ibid., dissent p .679.
These figures and those following are from Fox, "Water: Supply, Demand and
the Law" a paper read before the Mineral and Resources Law Section of the American
Bar Association at the annual meeting, August 25, 1959.

36.
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as compared with an increase of 24 % for the Nation. This
means that the Western population of about 26 or 27 million
will double to over 50 million by 1980. It seems to be a valid
assumption that most of our future growth and activity will
not be dependent upon the expansion of irrigation.
Available knowledge and an examination of trends indicate that the Rio Grande towns and the cities of the Pecos
sub-basin will have to think up a better theory than pueblo
rights to augment municipal supplies. In the first place, the
Cartwright decision probably will not prove applicable to the
facts, the law or the history of these many communities in
the state. Secondly, the rule of the case does not apply specifically to ground waters, yet cities will have to rely increasingly on that source of supply. Thirdly, the cloak of the police
power in the manner of the Cartwright decision is productive
of uncertainty, expensive litigation and unconvincing results.
It may be cheaper for towns to condemn water rights and
pay for them.

An Addendum to Cartwright
The Cartwright decision had an anomalous sequel. * In
February, 1960 the State Engineer of New Mexico petitioned
the United States District Court for a "writ of assistance"
to aid him in administering and enforcing the Hope decree.
He alleged that the Public Service Company "in disregard
and defiance of the judgment and decree" of the Federal
court, is using more than the 2,600 acre feet of water allowed
by the Hope Decree of 1933. The position of the State Engineer was that since 1935 he has been charged with the responsibility for enforcing the Hope Decree, but since the Cartwright decision he has been unable to do so because the Public Service Company "has appropriated to itself and to its own
use all of the water of the Gallinas river and has erected
dams, ways and works for the express purpose of utilizing
all of the water of said river. . . ."
• There were actually two sequels. In addition to the one in the Federal court discussed here, another action was filed on January 30, 1960 in the San Miguel County
District Court in which Cartwright and other plaintiffs asked damages from the Public
Service Company for interference with their irrigation rights from the Gallinas River.
This action is still pending,
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A hearing in the United States District Court was held
on March 2, 1960. On March 18, 1960 an opinion by United
States District Judge Carl Hatch was filed in which the judge
stated his reasons for denying the petition for the writ of
assistance. In this opinion the United States District Judge
said: 37
This Court has no intention of passing upon the correctness, or the incorrectness, of the decision of the New Mexico
Courts in the Cartwright case. Further it is not my intention
and I shall not pass upon the question of whether, or not, the
Pueblo Rights Doctrine applies in the State of New Mexico.
It is my considered opinion that the decision in the Cartwright case is substantive law. . . .
. . . When the late Judge Colin Neblett relinquished,
surrendered and renounced jurisdiction to administer or enforce the jurisdiction which had been retained in Section
Twenty-two of the original decree, he did not relinquish that
jurisdiction to the State Engineer or any other definite person
or official. With the language as strong as possible for a: Judge
to use, Judge Neblett totally and wholly abandoned, relinquished, surrendered and renounced jurisdiction to enforce
or administer the jurisdiction he had retained previously. It is
quite evident to me that he intended from that time on his
decree should be enforced and administered by qualified and
acting officials of the State of New Mexico. He intended to have
nothing more or further to do with the administration or enforcement of the decree. He gave no specific power to the State
Engineer of the State of New Mexico, and that apparently was
his intention and his purpose. That Judge Neblett accomplished
this purpose by the order he entered cannot be doubted. Neither,
in my opinion, can it be doubted that jurisdiction from this
Court passed, lapsed and no longer existed. That jurisdiction
has not been recaptured by any appropriate proceeding.
Whether it can be recaptured may well be doubted; but whether
so, or not, I do not now determine. Suffice it to say that at this
time no jurisdiction has been reinvested in this Court.
Another most anomalous, novel and possibly confusing
situation occurs by reason of a State Engineer of the State of
New Mexico coming into the Federal Court and asking this
Court to render assistance to him, a state official, to do that
37. Pages 5-7 of the copy of the opinion furnished the writer by Chief Judge Carl
Hatch. See Albuquerque Journal, Wednesday, February 3, 1960 (story on the filing of
the State Engineer's petition) p. A-I, and Albuquerque Journal, March 19, 1960, p. A-7
(story on denial of the petition).
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which would conflict with and be contrary to the decisions of
the Courts of his own state.
It is perhaps unnecessary for me to comment upon the
wisdom or propriety of a state official seeking to act contrary
to the decisions of the Courts of his own state. It may not be
amiss to say, however, that whether the decision in the Cartwright case is substantive law and binding upon a Federal
Court, it would seem most reasonable to suppose that it should
be mandatory law and binding upon the officials of the State
of New Mexico. . . .

It appears from these decisions that New Mexico has
adopted the California mutation of the doctrine of Pueblo
Rights. However, the questions of how this doctrine can be
applied and, more specifically, where it will be applied, remain open to doubt.

*

*

*

An Addendum Secundum

On August 11, 1960, in Cause No. 70800, the District
Court for Bernalillo County, MacPherson, Judge, held that
the City of Albuquerque was established as a pueblo grant
within the meaning of the Cartwright decision. From the
bench the Court said: "he [the State Engineer] could have
found that there was a pueblo founded in 1706, and that the
City of Albuquerque is its successor, and that consequently,
under the new state of the law, effective from September 3,
1959, forward, in the Cartwright Decision, that the city, as
successor to the pueblo land grant, has all the rights under
the old law of Spain . . . and has the right to take whatever water it may need, and as the city expands, the added
needs for present and future times." Historical material in
support of the conclusion was admitted in evidence. Formal
entry of the judgment awaits the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Although the decision purports to uphold
the validity of the Rio Grande Underground Basin declared
in November, 1956, it virtually removes the State Engineer's
control over withdrawals in the Basin. The District Judge's
decision will be appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
The case raises many of the questions presented in this article and some others also. R. E. C.

